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GERMANY AND 
THE MONETARY UNION 
Kristina Manolatos 
Introduction 
Currently, the European Community is 
experiencing a remarkable process of intensi-
fied economic and monetary integration. This 
process will include the realization of an eco-
nomic union in which goods, services and fac-
tors of production will move freely across 
national borders. This transition to stage three 
of the European Economic and Monetary Union 
will no doubt be a difficult period. Much will be 
new and unfamiliar, both for those inside and 
outside the European Union. The Maastricht 
Treaty directs that a common European cur-
rency be instituted to replace the various cur-
rencies of individual nations. A new European 
Central Bank, governed by directors of member 
countries, will be responsible for monetary pol-
icy, phasing out the ability of national central 
banks to conduct independent monetary poli-
cies. Success and failure will essentially depend 
on how confident the European population is 
with regard to the new currency. Therefore, it 
will be important to rely on what has been tried 
and tested in committing the European Central 
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Bank to pursue price stability and the granting 
of independence to this institution for an inte-
grated Europe. (Onno, p. 146) 
In this article I discuss Germany's role in 
the upcoming monetary union. I begin by pro-
viding an overview of the precursors leading to 
the signing of the Maastricht Treaty and out-
lining the three stages towards monetary union 
set forth in its text. Next, I present the means 
for the treaty's implementation and the poten-
tial benefits and consequences of its fulfillment. 
I then examine German support and opposition 
towards a single currency. I conclude by dis-
cussing the issues facing the European 
Monetary Union and its questionable future. 
Precursors to the Maastricht Treaty 
After the devastation caused by World War 
II, the leaders of Europe believed it was crucial 
for their nations to develop strong interrela-
tions in order to prevent a recurrence of war 
and to establish a market of free trade. To facil-
itate these goals, the European Community 
(EC), also known as the Common Market, was 
created to head the economic and political inte-
gration of Europe. This organization and its 
purposes were formally written into the Treaty 
of Rome in 1958. For the next fifteen years, 
only the six founding nations of the EC -
Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands- partici-
pated in this union. In 1973, Denmark, Ireland 
and the United Kingdom joined the EC. Greece, 
Portugal, and Spain followed during the 1980s. 
In early 1990, the EC pledged to create a com-
mon European foreign and defense policy by 
the end of 1992. The reunified Germany offi-
cially joined the EC in 1991. Also, during this 
year the European Economic Area, a large free-
trade zone, was formed to take effect at the 
onset of 1993. (Compton's) 
In December of 1991 the member states 
met in Maastricht, the Netherlands, to inaugu-
rate a plan for European economic and mone-
tary integration. The details of this strategy are 
set forth in the Maastricht Treaty, which con-
tains a formal agreement among the member 
states to create a European Central Bank (ECB). 
The treaty defines the next stages towards 
accomplishing monetary union, which are 
intended to institute a common European cur-
rency, central bank and exchange rate mecha-
nism (ERM) by 1999. In addition, the EC 's 
members plan to establish a common foreign 
and defense policy, to provide aid for destitute 
EC countries and to increase the powers of the 
EC parliament in economic and social policies 
while limiting these same powers of each 
national state. The EC took the name European 
Union (EU) in November of 1993. Austria, 
Finland and Sweden became members of the 
EU in 1995, and currently several other nations 
have officially applied for membership into the 
union. (Compton's) 
The Stages of Monetary Union 
The Maastricht Treaty outlines the three 
chronological stages of progression toward 
European monetary and economic integration. 
The first stage of monetary union began in mid-
1990. The European Monetary System (EMS), 
a group of EC countries formed in 1979 to 
achieve monetary union, initiated this transi-
tion by eliminating all remaining capital con-
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trois and developing cooperative ties between 
its central banks. Increased negotiations 
among member states launched the formal doc-
umentation of the Maastricht Treaty, officially 
defining the subsequent steps towards mone-
tary union. The first stage continued through 
1993, during which the participating countries 
were permitted to adjust interest rates in order 
to exert some control over exchange rate pari-
ties. (De Grauve, pp. 146-47) 
In compliance with the second stage set 
forth in the treaty, the European Monetary 
Institute (EMI) was created in early 1994 to 
serve as the predecessor to the future European 
Central Bank (ECB). The EMI is intended to 
operate only during this phase of monetary 
union. Its purpose is to improve and enhance 
monetary collaboration among member states' 
central banks and to prepare the European 
community for the establishment of the ECB. 
(De Grauve, p. 147) 
The third stage is not expected to begin 
until January of 1999. At this time, the 
exchange rates between national currencies will 
become irrevocably fixed, and the ECB will 
begin operations and circulation of the 
European currency unit (ECU). This final step 
along the path to monetary union is contingent 
upon the member states meeting several con-
vergence criteria, however. (De Grauve, p. 147) 
The following requirements were created to 
affirm each nation 's compatibility with the 
objectives of European Monetary Union (EMU) 
and determine whether a country may join the 
monetary union: 
• In an attempt to achieve price sta-
bility among the union, the rate of 
inflation of a member may not 
exceed 1.5 percent of the average of 
the three lowest inflation rates in 
the EMS. (Olsson, p. 1) 
• A nation's long-term interest rate 
must not exceed the average 
observed long-term interest rate 
of the three member nations with 
the lowest inflation rates by more 
than 2 percentage points. (Olsson, 
pp. 1-2) 
• To ensure that there is economic 
compatibility within the states, a 
nation's currency is not allowed to 
experience a devaluation during 
the two years preceding the 
entrance into the union; also its 
currency may not fluctuate more 
than 2.5 percent above or below the 
ECU. (Olsson, p. 2) 
• In order to assess the relative 
strength of a country's economy, 
economic policies and monetary 
system, a government's budget 
deficit may not be greater than 3 
percent of its gross domestic prod-
uct (GOP). 
• The last criterion provides another 
determinant for evaluating the 
strength of a nation's economy: a 
government's debt may not exceed 
60 percent of the nation's GOP. 
(Olsson, p. 2) 
When the Maastricht Treaty was signed, 
most member states were not in adherence with 
one or more of the convergence criteria. The 
treaty grants a time allowance to provide mem-
bers several years to improve their economic 
policies towards compliance. Also, the EMI was 
designated to advise and help coordinate nation 
states' monetary policies if nations so desired. 
The treaty provides that the European Council 
will decide whether a majority of members are 
in compliance with the various requirements 
prior to the end of 1996; if a majority qualify, 
the ECB will take over monetary policy from 
their respective central banks as soon as policy 
makers see fit. Since a majority were not 
expected to be ready in 1996, the members have 
planned for full monetary union by the begin-
ning of 1999, as provided by the treaty. Other 
countries may also join at that time if they meet 
the convergence criteria. (Whitt, p. 19) 
Plans for Implementation 
Within the provisions of the Maastricht 
Treaty there are two underlying objectives to be 
noted. First, it is stated that the transition to 
monetary union should be a gradual process in 
order for member states to absorb the econom-
ic and social shocks of such a progression. 
Second, it is not intended that all .countries 
simultaneously join the union. The EU perceives 
the differences in economic capabilities across 
national borders and therefore recognizes that 
national readiness for monetary union will 
occur on a country-specific basis. The treaty 
also states that the convergence criteria are not 
to be interpreted as "rigid rules" but rather as 
guidelines which allow for leeway. (De Grauve, 
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p. 148) Country qualification will be decided by 
a majority vote of the European Council in early 
1999. Regardless of country admittance, the 
European Central Bank and a European System 
of Central Banks will be established no later 
than July 1998. (Wise, pp. 304-305) 
Currently, as set forth by the Maastricht 
Treaty; global efforts are in process to prepare 
the new European Currency Unit (ECU) for cir-
culation. In Frankfurt the EU ministers of 
finance have initiated the production of new 
coins, bills and notes. Additionally, they are for-
mulating a method to determine the exchange 
rate mechanism at the time of the ECU's intro-
duction. Meanwhile, in Brussels a group of 
experts has been assigned the task of smooth-
ing out all technical difficulties encountered by 
banks, stores, vending machines, automated 
teller machines, etc. All such functions must 
be completed and functional before the ECU is 
circulated. (Walters, p. 36) 
The Consequences of a Single 
Currency 
There are numerous benefits to creating 
a single monetary unit for the European Union. 
Lower transaction costs will be experienced on 
all cross-border trade in Europe. No longer will 
businesses need to expend resources to deter-
mine exchange rate fluctuation impacts on 
their profits and losses for each sale conducted 
across national lines. Countries will be able to 
identify price variations more easily since all EU 
countries will be valuing their goods and serv-
ices in the same currency. Individual travelers 
will benefit from a single currency as they will 
no lopger be required to exchange currencies 
in order to engage in transactions while travel-
ing across borders. Estimated savings are pre-
dicted to range from 0.3 to 0.4 percent of annu-
al GOP, according to European Commission 
statistics. The Commission, a group of gov-
ernment economists, used the bid-ask prices in 
the markets to evaluate savings, most of which 
will result from the redirection of resources 
currently used for converting money values. 
The reduction in exchange rate costs is also 
expected to boost international trade, thereby 
further improving the social and economic wel-
fare of Europe. (Whitt, pp. 15-16) 
Monetary union also carries with it some 
drawbacks. First and foremost among the poten-
tial drawbacks is the loss of autonomy each 
country would experience with respect to mon-
etary policy. No longer would the governments 
of EU countries be able to engage in monetary 
practices to adjust the values of their respective 
currencies. A central European bank would like-
ly assume responsibility for this task. 
Additionally, countries would lose the exchange 
rate as a tool for economic stabilization. Given 
that only intra-community exchange rates will 
be discontinued, the size of the loss would 
depend on several factors , including the alter-
native adjustment tools available to a country to 
stabilize its economy. Some alternative means 
of stabilization may be to change fiscal policy or 
to change wage rates or prices. (Abraham, p. 16) 
German Support of European 
Integration 
Within Europe, many communities are 
questioning the feasibility of the economic tran-
sition set forth in the Maastricht Treaty. A dras-
tic change of political disposition will be 
required by each of the members of the 
European Union. A common theme across bor-
ders is the unwillingness to give up national 
identity, especially in Germany. Many countries 
also believe that the stages leading toward mon-
etary union must include additional political 
direction in order to facilitate the integration 
of such a diverse continent. (Bluth, p. 54) 
A majority of countries object to the 
Maastricht Treaty and its strategy; yet the 
Germans have supported an integrated Europe 
since the end of the Second World War. 
Following the War, Germany was in need of 
political restoration, as it had lost its sense of 
patriotism due to the Hitler era. The Nazis had 
successfully defaced German pride and identi-
ty, so the nation refocused by pledging to 
restructure its form of government and its 
economy. (Malcolm, p. 51) 
The nation's decision to revamp its econ-
omy has strengthened Germany's commitment 
to European integration, making it the most 
significant element of German foreign policy. 
Besides benefitting its economy, there are three 
additional reasons for Germany's strong sup-
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port of European integration. The EU would 
likely have similar positive economic and polit-
ical effects throughout eastern Europe. An alle-
viation of hostilities with France also con-
tributed to the decision to seek European 
integration. Finally, many Germans believe 
that such a consolidation of Europe would elim-
inate any future rivalry concerning the domi-
nation of Europe. Without integration, German 
foreign policy experts believe Germany would 
become Europe's leader by default, thus rekin-
dling old hostilities with its neighbors and other 
central European countries. (Bluth, p. 54) 
German Apprehension towards a 
Single Currency 
While the majority of Germans support 
European integration, approximately 60 per-
cent oppose the ECU. This split is uniquely 
characteristic of Germany; most countries 
either support or oppose both ideas. ("Super 
Salesman Required," p. 58) It is evident why so 
many Germans object to the ECU when their 
nation's historically impressive economy is 
directly tied to its D-mark. Throughout its his-
tory, western Germany has maintained a high-
ly competitive and varied industrial base while 
supporting open and free international trade. 
It has effectively controlled inflationary prob-
lems and stabilized its economic growth. 
Germans fear that sacrificing their precious D-
mark for the EU poses a high risk to their coun-
try 's stable financial position. (Schroeder 
Mi.inchmeyer Hengst & Co.) 
The apprehensiveness of German citizens 
is recognized by German politicians who voice 
opposition to the EU's mission of a single cur-
rency. The German public has been disturbed 
by the idea ever since the early 1990s, when the 
idea of a Euro-currency was first introduced. 
Polls conducted during early 1995 have evi-
denced the population's continuing opposition 
to European Monetary Union. These surveys 
show that 80 percent of German college stu-
dents object to the ECU. (Schroeder 
Mi.inchmeyer Hengst & Co.) It was also found 
that more than 50 percent of all Germans 
believe that the use of the ECU will inevitably 
result in a devaluation of their savings. 
(Gumbel, p. A9) 
With regard to the currency transition, 
there are a number of potential consequences 
for Germans that may be inferred, the foremost 
being the risk of market instability of the new 
currency. Another consequence is the possi-
bility of increased inflation within Germany and 
the rising interest rate differentials between it 
and other countries joining the EU. Finally, 
since capital markets diminish the future risks 
of a country's debt, the German rates on long-
term obligations would most likely begin to 
demand premiums due to the uncertain conse-
quences of unification. (Schroeder Munch-
meyer Hengst & Co.) 
German investors have become anxious 
while contemplating the possible repercussions 
of a single currency on their portfolios. Many 
are trying to secure their monies by investing 
in other countries using funds previously with-
drawn from domestic securities. During the 
first six months of 1995, for example, Germans 
withdrew almost 11 billion marks (approxi-
mately $7.73 billion) from German investments 
in Luxembourg. In addition, the recent inflow 
of German investments into Swiss-franc assets 
despite the lower Swiss returns illustrates the 
potential impact of a single currency on the 
European market. Currently, German bankers 
are at a loss for a course of action because even 
though they support a single currency, they 
cannot disregard their customers ' concerns. 
(Gumbel, p. A9) 
Whether or not an EMU is established is 
an issue currently affecting the capital markets 
and the European economy. General investors, 
foreign speculators and other individuals with 
a stake in the German economy and financial 
markets are requesting an immediate resolu-
tion of EMU consequences on their invest-
ments. (Schroeder Mlinchmeyer Hengst & Co.) 
Based on reports provided by the German 
Chamber of Industry and Trade, mid-sized busi-
nesses , a major component of the German 
economy, are upset with the transition to a sin-
gle currency. This market segment's recent 
experience of absorbing eastern Germany's 
deficit in 1990 provides justification for its dis-
pleasure. West German financial aid for its east-
ern counterpart, derived from increased taxes 
and interest rates, totaled $329 billion from 
1991-1994. (Tagliabue, p. D7) Since prices are 
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predicted to rise and funds are expected to flow 
from the wealthier to the poorer EU members, 
it is anticipated that Germany will have to take 
similar measures to aid other members of EMU. 
(Schroeder Mlinchmeyer Hengst & Co.) 
Europe 's existing monetary system has 
caused German businesses much anxiety, as an 
appreciating mark and currency devaluations 
throughout the continent have effectively 
depleted their export profits. Moreover, the 
Germans do not wish Italy to be an initiating 
member because of its high deficits and debt. 
Germany has also repeatedly warned France to 
reduce its deficit if it wishes to be included. 
Germany plans to uphold stringent monetary 
regulations over the rest of Europe, even after 
1999. In late 1995, German Finance Minister 
Theo Waigel proposed a "stability pact" which, 
if accepted, would mandate the regulation of 
every nation's fiscal policy even after the onset 
of the EMU, and would additionally require 
members to achieve budget deficits even lower 
than those required by the current convergence 
criteria for admission. Germany also proposes 
that countries which do not "stay in line" 
should face sanctions or fines. (Javetski, p. 54) 
Germany insists that the new EMU be 
made to emulate its stable D-mark, conserva-
tive monetary policy, and strong ever-growing 
economy. Its demands are essentially an effort 
to instill confidence in its citizens that the EMU 
will not weaken Germany's acclaimed monetary 
and fiscal order. This seems most vital to its 
political leaders, who are not convinced that 
they will be able to sell monetary union to their 
own people. All in all, it will prove difficult to 
persuade German voters that the idea of giving 
up their dependable D-mark is advantageous in 
the long term. (Javetski, p. 54) 
Issues Facing EMU 
With fewer than three years remaining 
before the scheduled deadline for the imple-
mentation of the ECU, the European Union 
seems threatened by its members ' respective 
domestic problems. Throughout Europe 
unemployment has averaged twice the level of 
the United States, and the hope of improvement 
seems grim. In France and Italy tax revenues 
are on the decline and deficits are expanding. 
Economists feel that the European economies 
are coming into a recession and attribute this 
slowed growth to these nations' futile attempts 
at complying with the Maastricht Treaty's cri-
teria. In an attempt to qualify for union, many 
governments have restricted their budget 
deficits, inflation rates, interest rates, and accu-
mulated debt. Since consumer spending and 
investment is being restrained, European cen-
tral banks are feeling pressured to accommo-
date more rapid economic growth. The 
Bundesbank in Germany seems to be the least 
affected to date. (Tagliabue, p. 07) A$ the chair-
man of a large Swiss bank said while attending 
the World Economic Forum in February of 
1995, "It is like a group of political leaders want 
this to happen and will not listen to what the 
public is saying. " Others at the conference 
agreed "that European central bankers, led by 
the Bundesbank of Germany, were too timid in 
lowering interest rates - a step that could be 
expected to lead to more investment and con-
sumer demand, and ultimately to more jobs." 
(Nash, p. 01) 
As the debate over Europe 's future con-
tinues, German officials pushing towards inte-
gration have begun to concede that the pro-
posal deadline may not work because so many 
countries will be unable to meet the member-
ship criteria. This could produce several dif-
ferent outcomes. The January 1, 1999, dead-
line may not be met for issuing the new 
currency, thus creating a setback to the entire 
European integration system. On the other 
hand, policy makers could allow monetary 
union to proceed, leaving some countries out 
of the union and ultimately dividing Europe 
into two distinct segments. Finally, if no coun-
tries meet the criteria, there is a fear, especial-
ly among the German population, that the 
"rules will be bent" and there will be widespread 
inflation throughout Europe. (Cowell, p. AS) 
There is a concern throughout the conti-
nent that Germans will vote against European 
integration unless they are provided with assur-
ance that their growing economy will not be sti-
fled and that union members will fulfill their 
fiscal responsibilities to secure such a guaran-
tee. Chancellor Helmut Kohl has frequently 
been quoted in alerting both Germans and 
Europeans in general that European integra-
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tion is a "matter of war and peace in the 21st 
century." (Cowell, p. AlO) As Kohl has stated: 
From bitter historical experience, we 
know how quickly inflation destroys 
confidence in the reliability of politi-
cal institutions and ends up endan-
gering democracy. It is therefore no 
German hysteria when, in connection 
with European economic and mone-
tary union, we stress forcibly that the 
Maastricht criteria must be met at all 
costs and under no circumstances are 
open for discussion. (Cowell, p. AlO) 
He additionally has warned that individual 
countries must submerge their sense of nation 
in a united continent. (Cowell, p. AlO) 
Germany and France, the two most inte-
gral members for a successful monetary union, 
have repeatedly argued over the principles and 
effects of the proposed European Monetary 
Union. The closer Europe comes to EMU, the 
more tension will increase between France and 
Germany. Many questions continue to be 
debated. Which economic figures will be 
accepted as reliable to show whether a country 
qualifies for participation? When should each 
nation's debt be issued in the new currency? 
When should the new currency be enforced as 
legal tender? And how soon will European lead-
ers decide which nations are in compliance with 
the convergence criteria? (Nash, p. 07) 
The Future of EMU 
The Maastricht Treaty has been officially 
ratified , and its qualifying members have 
pledged to embark upon monetary union no 
later than January 1, 1999. Even so, a feeling 
of uncertainty prevails regarding the timing of 
monetary union and the preservation of nation-
al identities. It is important that the period of 
uncertainty be minimized since it is likely to 
create turbulence in the foreign exchange mar-
kets. It is generally believed that it would be 
best for those countries capable of meeting the 
requirements to proceed with monetary union 
as early as possible. The treaty's allowance for 
early admission to the EMU by a majority in 
1996 has been canceled since most countries 
are not in conformity with the convergence cri-
teria. It may happen that this uncertain peri-
od of transition will continue into the next cen-
tury if none of the EU members satisfy all of the 
treaty's criteria for EMU by 1999. More likely 
to occur, though, is the initiation of only a few 
members into the EMU by the end of this cen-
tury. Britain, Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain and 
Belgium are expected to be among those EU 
participants left out. If this were to occur, the 
EMU would most likely be controlled more by 
the reunified Germany rather than by the EMS. 
In such a union Germany may be confronted 
with additional French hostility. (Whitt, p. 27) 
In any case, it is evident that the road to 
monetary union will be much more difficult 
than was envisioned when the Maastricht Treaty 
was signed in 1991. Additional turmoil is like-
ly, at least as long as it remains uncertain which 
countries will end up unifying their currencies 
and at what exchange rates. However, barring 
the occurrence of another such major event as 
German reunification in the next few years, the 
Maastricht Treaty's goal of monetary union by 
the end of the decade will be realized. 
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